Author: James Ockey, University of Canterbury
Thailand’s government has been unable to subdue anti-government demonstrations despite major investments in cyber warfare capabilities. As student protestors continue to expand their reach and influence on social media, the Prayuth Chan-o-cha government faces an increasingly difficult choice between concession and suppression.
Frustrated with the limits placed on democracy and perceived collusion between the military and the monarchy, Thai students have organised months of sustained protests in Bangkok. The current wave of demonstrations is the result of years of organising efforts that began during the five years of martial law and military rule from 2014–19. While turnout was small and protests quickly repressed during that time, organisers of these events often reported tens of thousands of followers on social media. In-person demonstrations represented only the tip of a much larger iceberg of resistance.
The National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), the military junta led by Prayuth, was aware of these undercurrents and developed an online battle plan. After seizing power in 2014, the NCPO tasked the army to lead newly-established cyber divisions in each branch of the Royal Thai Armed Forces. Cyber operations underwent major upgrades two years later with the intent to protect the monarchy and suppress insurgency in Thailand’s south. The junta also encouraged citizens to report on the social media activities of fellow citizens, in an attempt to expand its surveillance reach. By the time protests emerged in 2020, junta was ready to go on the attack.
Demonstrations began in January 2020 after the pro-reform Future Forward Party was banned by the courts. Future Forward ran on an anti-military, pro-democracy platform and was heavily engaged with supporters on social media, appealing to young voters. Following the party’s dissolution, students demanded the resignation of Prayuth, constitutional reforms, dissolution of parliament and new elections. When the COVID-19 pandemic interrupted these protests, organisers moved them online. The movement grew through social media, and demonstrators returned to the streets in July adding a demand for monarchy reform.
The initial government response was measured. Leading figures issued warnings to the demonstrators, labelling their demands inappropriate and excessive. The government then tried to undermine the movement by arresting some of its leaders, but these intimidation efforts failed. Courts quickly granted bail and organisers returned to the demonstrations.
The regime also moved the fight online. The army cyber warfare unit, and later a twitter account linked to a volunteer programme backed by the military and the palace, promoted pro-military and pro-monarchy sentiment online, while amplifying anti-demonstrator social media content, increasing tensions amid rising violence.
In an attempt to ease these tensions, Thailand’s parliament has sought to reach a compromise. Debates on constitutional reform were accelerated, and a proposed reconciliation commission, which would seek to create national harmony, is slowly coming to fruition. But there is little incentive for appointed politicians in the senate to agree to curtail their own power. Further, the virtual organisation and dispersed leadership of the student movement makes any negotiation problematic. Legislative processes are slow moving and have failed to keep up with the disparate and evolving demands of protestors.
What remains is concession or suppression. In principle, the government could concede to some of the demands of demonstrators by dissolving parliament, holding new elections or convincing Prayuth to resign — a move supported by some prominent political figures. But the junta leader-cum-prime minister clung to power through five years of military rule and carefully engineered his 2019 election victory. While Thai demonstrators have overthrown governments and removed prime ministers in the past — most recently in 1992 — it was only after harsh, violent suppression failed.
Should Prayuth resort to such tactics, he will likely encounter greater resistance. Despite rising violence, public opinion has largely been with the students, and a harsh crackdown would seemingly prove the students right in their assessment of the political situation. In addition, it is unclear who would lead a crackdown. While Prayuth heads the government, he no longer leads the military. Army Commander General Narongpan Jitkaewthae is loyal to the throne, not the prime minister, and King Vajiralongkorn himself commands some 5000 troops based in Bangkok. Neither Prayuth nor the King would willingly take the blame for a harsh crackdown on student protestors.
Demonstrators have the edge for now. Despite investments in cyber warfare, Thailand’s armed forces are unable to keep up with protesters’ social media reach and appeal. Both small and large-scale demonstrations are proving sustainable, conventional police tactics are not. The longer unrest continues, the more government leaders will face increasing pressure to resolve the crisis through either concession or suppression.
James Ockey is Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Canterbury.
